It is easy to see how such parties might serve democ racy. Voters can give more effective direction to govern ment by supporting a team's program rather than an individual's. By holding entire parties rather than individ ual politicians accountable for what government does, vot ers create an incentive for responsible governance that might not otherwise exist.
We contest the view of party that supports this rosy assessment. We argue that parties in the United States are best understood as coalitions of interest groups and activ ists seeking to capture and use government for their par ticular goals, which range from material self-interest to high-minded idealism. The coalition of policy-demanding groups develops an agenda of mutually acceptable poli cies, insists on the nomination of candidates with a dem onstrated commitment to its program, and works to elect these candidates to office. In this group-centric view of parties, candidates will, if the coalition has selected them well, have as their paramount goal the advancement of the party program.
Most studies of parties assume that voters can judge which party offers more of what they want, implying that parties must construct programs with a keen eye to voter satisfaction. We regard this assumption as unrealistic. In its place we theorize an "electoral blind spot" within which In our account, parties are no great friends of popular sovereignty. Electoral competition does constrain group centric parties to be somewhat responsive to citizen pref erences, but they cede as little policy to voters as possible.
Parties mainly push their own agendas and aim to get voters to go along.
Despite basic differences between our theory and the standard view of parties, critical tests are hard to identify.
Some telling evidence exists, but party nominations, central to our theory, are hard to study and poorly doc umented. Measuring party responsiveness to groups or to voters is difficult. Hence, we content ourselves here with developing our theory and demonstrating its plausibility.
Our argument begins with a survey of party literature.
We next develop our alternative theory, first as an extended hypothetical story, then with more precision. We next describe relevant empirical evidence. We conclude with an argument for more attention to the role of interest groups and activists in parties, and the role of parties in policy-making and representation.
Legislative-Centered Theories of Party
Textbooks on political parties in the mid-twentieth cen tury assigned a central role to interest groups, then con sidered the "raw material of politics."1 Five decades later, the view is radically different. The disciplines most devel oped theories of party feature office holders, especially legislators, as the dominant actors. This legislative focus emerged as studies of party out side the legislature reported weakening and decline. Party identification in the electorate began to decrease in the 1960s and remained below historical levels through the 1980s. The decline of traditional urban machines and other developments brought loss of party control over legisla tive nominations.2 The McGovern-Fraser reforms of the 1970s opened presidential nominations to mass participa tion in state primaries and caucuses; as party leaders lost their official role, many scholars concluded that parties had little impact on nominations.3 During roughly this same time period, observers of Congress began to note increasing influence of majority party leadership, and much stronger evidence of partisan voting than had previously been recognized.4 Scholars seeking to understand how party mattered in Congress quite naturally-given the consensus about the weakness of parties in other domains-focused on forces internal to Congress itself.
The theoretical view of parties in Congress is best intro duced in the account of a mythical legislature first offered by Thomas Schwartz, then extended by John Aldrich.5 This logic underlies most current theorizing about legis lative politics and also deeply influenced our alternative, group-centered view.
The legislature of the Schwartz-Aldrich myth has three members (A, B, C.) Each member sponsors a bill (X, Y, Z) that provides benefits to her own district and imposes costs on the others. Pay-offs (from Aldrich6) for each bill and each district are: If each legislator votes based on how her own district is affected, all three bills fail and pay-offs are zero. All three legislators would be better off, however, if all the bills passed; each player would get a pay-off of 1. But A and B could do better still by forming a "long coalition," by both voting in favor of X and Y, and against Z. Without the long coalition, the decisive majority is different for each bill (the coalition of B and C defeats X, the coalition of A and C defeats Y, etc.) By forming a majority coalition that stays together across votes, A and B increase their pay-offs to 2. The gains from keeping a stable majority together form Schwartz's and Aldrich's answer to the ques tion "Why Parties?"
The question then becomes, how does a party keep its long coalition together? According to Gary Cox and Mathew McCubbins, party leaders control the legislative agenda, suppressing proposals that might split the party and promoting the party program. The policies thus enacted create a "brand name," valuable for winning elections.7
The "brand name" concept begins to connect legisla tive theories with forces outside Congress. John Aldrich goes further, arguing that parties, while emerging from legislative politics, solve many problems legislators face as they attempt to win re-election and build stable careers.8
Legislative-centered theories of party have thus grown to incorporate broader aspects of political and social life, including the preferences of voters and groups. But these broader forces impact parties only via the narrow conduit of politicians' electoral incentives. The desire of incum bent office-holders for re-election animates parties, and forms the basis of theories that measure their impact. This view is plausible, but, in our view, limited. Yes, long coalitions are valuable to legislators pork-barreling for their districts. But they are also valuable for policy demanders nominating candidates. The logic of long coali tions transcends the legislative context, and we shall use it below in our account of parties as coalitions of interest groups and activists.
Recent empirical scholarship has documented anoma lies for politician-centered theories. The reputations cre ated by legislative parties have been shown to hurt rather than help the re-election chances of members of Con gress.9 A study of presidential nominations has argued that party insiders have managed to reassert much of their lost influence.10 Evidence from California has demon strated that in the absence of activist oversight of nomi nations, legislators do not form legislative long coalitions, but take the simpler path of selling policy piecemeal to private bidders.11 Finally, several studies have found that reorganization of party coalitions on racial issues in the 1940s and 50s sprang from demands of interest groups and activists within the party coalitions.12 Our theory of party has developed out of several of these recent studies, which we will review in more detail.
We first turn to our own myth of party origin. Our myth encompasses both political and societal forces, making it more complex than the Schwartz-Aldrich myth. The purpose is the same, however: our stylized before-and after narrative aims to convey a logic for why parties form and how they matter.
An Alternative Theory
Imagine a society in which no parties yet exist, about to elect its first president. The president governs by fiat, with re-election possible but not guaranteed.
Within this society, four groups of intense "policy demanders" have organized to promote policies that ben efit group members but impose costs on society as a whole.
The shepherds, for example, want a tariff on wool imports to increase the price they can charge for their homegrown wool. While many voters bemoan the high price of cloth ing, they know little about tariff policy or the arcane pol icy goals of other intense minorities.
As the election approaches, the shepherds work together to elect one of their own, who naturally favors a high tariff on wool imports. The shepherds are not rich or numer ous, but in an otherwise unstructured electoral environ ment, with most voters uninterested, their chance of winning is high.
But then another group, teachers, notices what the shepherds are up to. The teachers calculate they could easily outspend the shepherds to elect a teacher, whose top priority would be school construction. Or, they reason, they could join forces with the shepherds. The latter option seems preferable: a candidate supported by multiple groups is even more likely to win. Leaders of the teachers union understand that the wool tariff increases the price every one pays for wool, but this consideration is small com pared to their desire for better school facilities. As they begin to pay more attention, two other groups, clergy and coffee growers, make similar calculations. The four groups decide they can do better by cooperating in electoral pol itics than by competing against each other.
The coalition encounters problems, however. As the Freedom and Heritage Parties compete over many elections, political discourse is dominated by conflict between them. The party programs become accepted as natural manifestations of competing worldviews: a "con servative" one that seeks to protect and restore the tradi tions of a religious society of herders, and a "liberal" one oriented toward cultivating human capital and infrastruc ture to compete in the global economy. Some voters who care nothing about the interests of the various groups are nonetheless attracted to their parties because of the "val ues," such as social order or equality, that they perceive in their programs. The conservative and liberal ideologies help the groups define the terms of their cooperation; they also promote the useful fiction that everyone in the coalition wants the same things,13
Yet the mobilization of new groups and values also makes the party coalitions more heterogeneous, more difficult to manage. Close observers note that the main economic dimension is crosscut by a secular/religious cleavage, as depicted in figure 1. For example, religious coffee growers sometimes vote Heritage because of the party's temper ance plank. Even the saloonkeepers, despite continuing conflicts with the clergy over business hours, sometimes defect to Heritage in protest of the humanistic ideas teach ers push on their children.
The parties respond to these internal tensions with sharper rhetorical appeals to Freedom and Heritage, saying less about specific programs, and continuing to nominate candidates committed to the party's entire agenda. Some voters buy the vague appeals, but others are confused and end up voting on the basis of the per formance of the economy. The groups are happy enough with this outcome. Each coalition controls government about half the time, an outcome much better than the numerically small policy-demanders could achieve with out parties. Another tack is to get a genuine friend nominated and elected to office. In seeking to control a nomination, inter est groups and activists are in a stronger position. Multi ple aspiring office-seekers, none secure in the office they covet, compete for contributions and other campaign resources. At minimum, interest and activist groups can require promises of policy support. Often they can hold out for candidates who have actually demonstrated their commitment through prior service. In the small worlds of local politics, leading individuals are well known to each other; by selecting nominees out of such pools, policy demanding groups can be fairly confident of getting the politician16 they want.
Notice that this nomination process can, if the groups work it well, produce a different kind of politician than envisioned in standard theories of party-a politician com mitted more strongly to a particular agenda than to office holding per se. This is not to say that such politicians would take quixotic positions leading to pointless elec toral defeats. This would do no good for them or the party. But they would take risks for policy that candidates in a politician-dominated party would not. as a long coalition. The long coalition strives to nominate a candidate whom each group trusts to represent its inter ests in a manner acceptable to the coalition as a whole. As in legislative long coalitions, each group is expected to support the party's position in most nomination contests and to oppose it in few.
There are important differences between legislative and nominating coalitions, however. In the legislature, "sup porting" the party means voting for its bills. In the elec toral context, "supporting" means contributing resources (money, manpower, or expertise) to its candidates. In legislative long coalitions, each legislator makes an iden tical contribution to success (a single vote) up until the 50-percent-plus-l threshold is reached. In electoral long coalitions, contributions vary in size and nature. George W. Bush was more conservative than A1 Gore. Voter awareness is even lower for two concrete policy items at the heart of the current partisan divide-limits on abortion, and cuts in government spending. Only 47 percent knew which party controlled the House of Representatives.
How much should a party be expected to moderate its positions in deference to an electorate in which half the voters do not even know whether it or its opposition While ideological positioning seems to have relatively little effect on presidential elections, uncontrollable events can have large effects. Christopher Achen and Larry Bar tels showed that bad weather (droughts, hurricanes) in the election year leads to substantial vote loss by the incum bent president's party. Weather, they estimate, cost Gore one million votes in the 2000 election.18 Unsuccessful wars also hurt the incumbent party.19 The largest and best-documented effect on presidential elections is the performance of the national economy, which is only marginally more amenable to political control than the weather. If voters held presidents accountable for eco nomic performance over their full term in office, eco nomic voting might be defensible as a criterion of choice. But voters actually seem to be influenced mainly by eco nomic conditions over the last six months before Election Day.20 Again, one must ask how much attention should parties be expected to pay to voter preferences when a roll of the dice six months before Election Day will be the biggest factor in the election.21
To be sure, parties must tread carefully. As Key famously argued, voters are not fools.22 Poorly informed voters can find cues and heuristics that allow them to make sense of politics and respond with a degree of rationality.23 A can didate with a reputation for extremism will fare poorly with voters who, though lacking a coherent ideology, still know they don't like extremism. Candidates who attack very popular programs like social security, or promote unpopular ones like busing to achieve racial integration may likewise arouse the ire of voters not usually attentive to politics. So, on the one hand voters can recognize and react against some kinds of extremism. On the other hand, many voters, especially swing voters, know dramatically little about politics.24 In the competitive world of elec tions, voter ignorance gives parties the opportunity to win with candidates more extreme than swing voters would like if they knew better. We call the policy region over which aggregate electorates do not enforce their prefer ences the "electoral blind spot." Figure 2 illustrates the electoral blind spot, using the ideological space constructed by the coalitions of policy demanders in our myth. As in figure 1, the ideal points for the Heritage Party (HP) and the Freedom Party (FP) reflect negotiated agreements among each party's constituent pol icy demanders.
The typical voter's ideal point is at the origin. The policies marketed as "Freedom" or "Heritage" (or even "competitiveness" or "protectionism") are crafted to bestow benefits on the organized few; any benefits experienced by the unorganized masses are happy accidents. Fully informed voters would thus vote for the candidate closer to the origin, creating pressure for both parties to scale back the policy demands they were created to promote.
But uninformed voters may not be able to tell which platform they prefer.
Consider first an extreme case, in which voters pay no attention at all, completely unable to distinguish between candidates' positions, no matter how outrageous. In this tions. This is the assumption normally made in spatial vot ing models, usually (we hasten to note) for purposes of simplicity, not veracity. Under the assumption of fully informed voters, with a majority of voter ideal points at the origin, the party with most moderate nominee will win.
More realistic than either extreme is the assumption that voters notice and react to differences in positions only when they are sufficiently large. In figure 2 , the dark, smaller circle in the center represents the electoral blind spot, the set of positions that a voter will treat as essen tially equivalent.25 To our inattentive voter, all the posi tions in the electoral blind spot (which includes her ideal point) sound pretty reasonable; she would not quibble with any of them. Most important, the voter chooses among candidates located within the electoral blind spot on the basis of something other than policy position (cha risma, the economy, etc.).
The lighter-shaded donut-shaped area represents another equivalence class of positions; the voter regards all posi tions in this area as equivalent to each other, but worse than any position in the blind spot. That is, the voter recognizes that both policies fjp' and hp' are somewhat more extreme than she would like. She does not, however, recognize that point fp' (too much Freedom) is actually closer to her ideal point than point hp' (too much Heritage.) If low information creates wide bands of equivalence for voters, each party has an incentive to nominate a can didate whose position is just on the edge of the electoral blind spot-that is, to a point like fp" or hp". Nominat ing a more extreme candidate will lead to defeat. That is, if Freedom's candidate scales back the party's demands for highways, schools and beverages to fp", but if Heritage's candidate promotes tariff and religion to the level of hp', Heritage is certain to lose. There is no need for either party, however, to scale back beyond the point where vot ers notice any difference. As long as parties stay within the electoral blind spot, they are effectively free to nominate any candidate they want. They have nothing to gain from further compromise, nothing to lose from sticking to their guns. The more voters are blind to extremism-and the more election outcomes are affected by non-policy factors like economic voting and charisma-the more leeway par ties have to nominate extremists.
Voters can be blind to the meaning of positions taken by parties in government as well as in election campaigns.
They may, for example, believe that the governing party's health reform proposal is little different from that of the opposition party, even when the consequences differ sig nificantly. Such lack of acuity increases the freedom of majority party office holders to take positions as extreme as they please-or as their core interest groups and activ ists wish them to do.
In practice, the blind spot is neither clearly demarcated nor fixed for all time. Parties must trade off the appeal of candidates more clearly committed to its policy demands against the risks of losing the election by straying outside the blind spot. Within each coalition, groups may evalu ate this trade-off differently. Much intra-party conflict over nominations boils down to disagreement about the size of the blind spot, e.g., how much must commitment to party ideals be sacrificed to appeal to centrist voters?
Other scholars have observed that parties may be uncer tain about what exactly voters want, and that this uncer tainty can lead them to adopt non-centrist positions.26 Our theoretical claim is different. Lack of voter attentive ness creates license for parties to take non-centrist posi tions, regardless of what voters may actually want. It is possible that both theories help to explain why parties polarize, but we offer specific evidence for the blind spot argument: Exogenous changes in the amount of informa tion available to voters about their representatives increases the risk that extremist legislators will be recognized as such and voted out of office.
Competing Views of Party
Edmund Burke's definition of a political party as "a body of men united . . . upon some particular principle" is the foil of nearly every scholar who cites it. The modern view, first articulated by Joseph Schumpeter in Capitalism, Social ism, and Democracy, is that "a party is a group whose mem bers propose to act in concert in the competitive struggle for power." Schumpeter's view emphasizes the extent to which electoral competition drives the actions of politi cians and therefore parties. "What businessmen do not understand," he quotes a politician as saying, "is that exactly as they are dealing in oil so I am dealing in votes."27 As evidence against Burke's position, Schumpeter goes on to note that different parties may adopt identical platforms. Anthony Downs subsequently connected these points, arguing that platform convergence was a logical conse quence of the pressures of electoral competition on office seeking parties.28
Leading contemporary studies of political parties con tinue in this intellectual tradition. Parties, and the politi cians who lead them, are about one overwhelmingly important thing: gaining office. Policy commitments are, in most theories of party, secondary or non-existent.
Contemporary scholars do, of course, recognize that parties fail to converge to the position of the median voter.
Various special explanations, such as imperfect political competition or uncertainty about what voters want, are invoked to cover these cases. In particular, scholars recog nize the existence of "party-linked" groups and activists who attempt to pull parties away from the position of the median voter, but they regard the groups either as separate from the party itself or as secondary influences within the party. Marjorie Randon Hershey's comments in the fif teenth edition of Party Politics in America typifies this perspective:
In addition to competition within each party, parties also com pete on the electoral stage with other political organizations.
Groups such as single-issue organizations, labor unions, religious lobbies, insurance companies, and other corporations involve themselves in campaigns in order to achieve their political goals. Some of these groups work very aggressively to help candidates get nominated, raise money, influence public opinion, and win elections.29 Activists working with these outside groups are usually treated separately from true party activists, who join cam paigns or volunteer for explicitly partisan efforts. But true party activists can also be motivated by ideological or issue specific goals. Hershey writes that such amateurs activists are "essential to a party's success" because of their volun teer efforts, but they can be harder for party leaders to control. Hershey characterizes this potentially rogue labor force as a challenge to "pragmatic parties, dedicated to the party's success above all else."30 John Aldrich takes a position even closer to ours. In the 2011 edition of Why Parties? he writes that "the major polit ical party is the creature of the politicians, the partisan activ ist, and the ambitious office seeker and officeholder."31 He continues, remarking that" those who seek and holdpolitical office ... are the central actors in the party".32 Comment ing on the activists, who are more extreme than most voters and pressure the politicians to adopt extreme views as well, Aldrich writes that "the political role of this part of the party is to attempt to constrain the actual leaders of the party, its ambitious office seekers as they try to . . . [appeal] In the late 1790s, discussion clubs were overtaken by "party committees," groups of self-starting citizens who nominated slates of Democratic-Republican candidates for all offices, including the critical role of Elector in the Elec toral College. These nominations successfully channeled anti-Federalist votes to approved candidates,36 invariably men who favored popular sovereignty, equal rights for white males, states' rights, and limited national govern ment. This ideology, which had evolved in the intense newspaper culture of the day,37 unified disparate policy demanders-southern planters, the growing middle class of the north, and western settlers-in a national coalition.
We have sought evidence that ambitious office holders in Congress or elsewhere led formation of the Democratic Republican party and found little. Even Jefferson, the first presidential nominee of the party, played little role in its organization.38
The key elements in this account-the rise of citizen discussion clubs which challenged Federalist candidates, their replacement by citizen committees to nominate slates committed to a party program, and use of ideology to mobilize diverse interests behind a national program-are standard history for this period. What is novel here is fitting these pieces into a theory of political parties that applies to the contemporary era as well.
Change in Party Coalitions
Party coalitions have changed greatly in the course of Amer ican history. In this section, we sketch two of these changes-the incorporation of civil rights for African Amer icans into the Democratic Party agenda, and incorpora tion of an anti-abortion position into the Republican Party agenda. We shall argue that policy demanders rather than office-holders initiated these important changes.
In a study that frames much research on changes in ists. Once a policy-demanding group, such as civil rights or anti-abortion activists, becomes part of a party, the normal operation of nomination processes produces can didates committed to the group's cause. Any "good Dem ocrat" or "good Republican" can be counted on, even at real risk to their own careers. In the next section we shall see what taking risks for policy looks like. One leading theory of office-holder parties holds that leg islators organize parties in order to control the agenda on behalf of an electorally valuable "brand name."55 In recent decades, the Democratic brand is associated with ideolog ical liberalism and the Republican brand with conservatism. These findings make it hard to argue that polarized party brands attract voters. One might still contend that the party brands have indirect electoral value because they please core policy demanders who then exert themselves for the re-election of legislators. But we would counter that parties that aim to achieve electoral success by first pleasing policy-demanding groups, forgoing the more straightforward path of centrism to do so, are best described as group-centered.
The preference of voters for moderates over partisan extremists is so strong that one may wonder why Con gress has so few moderates (see figure 3) . One reason is that overall congruence between media markets and con gressional districts is, as noted above, quite low-high enough to make clear that better-informed electorates favor centrists, but not high enough to elect a large number of them. Another reason, as we discuss below, is that mod erates find it hard to win nomination-and may be de-nominated if they stray from party orthodoxy after often in response to events like war and recession that might cause big losses even for moderate parties. In quiet times, extremists (and everyone else) face only a small risk of defeat. Politicians selected at nomination time to value policy over office would be foolish to legislate cautiously in lengthy periods of political quiet-and might not be permitted by interest groups and activists to do so. The means by which Congress limits (in Arnold's term) the "traceability" of its actions are myriad. Unrelated pol icies are bundled in omnibus legislation;65 major provi sions are added or subtracted from bills in conference reports, which are subject to up or down votes with little debate. Unpopular measures are delegated to bureaucrats using procedures rigged to produce the desired outcome, while creating "political daylight" between legislators and policy consequences.66
The brightness of this political daylight widens voters' blind spot. Few voters, for example, can follow the com plex procedures that the majority party in the House of Representatives uses to enact its brand name legislation. The key vote on many bills is often the vote to adopt the "rule" specifying what amendments can be offered, the order in which they are voted, and the substitution of new elements as debate proceeds. Scholars have noted that leg islators with overall moderate records vote for rules that assure passage of more extreme legislation than they nom inally favor. Systematic evidence that party control of nominations has this effect is, however, lacking. Indeed, the textbook view is that parties have little control over legislative nom inations. They may sometimes recruit candidates to run in the other party's bastions, or to head off nomination of an extremist in a moderate district, but in the large majority of races, parties play little role. When they do intervene, it is typically to bolster incumbents or to back the most electable candidate, rather than to find some one more supportive of the party's legislative agenda. As Paul Herrnson writes, "Candidates, not parties, are the major focus of congressional campaigns. . . . The need to win a party nomination forces congressional candidates to assemble their own campaign organizations, formulate their own electoral strategies, and conduct their own cam paigns."70 Or, as Gary Jacobson puts it, a nomination "is not something to be awarded by the party but rather a prize to be fought over ... by freebooting political entrepreneurs. "71 But freebooting entrepreneurs do not fight with bare knuckles. They need money, door knockers, pollsters, ad makers, and much else. Where do they get these resources?
Usually from the coalition of interest groups and activists associated with a party in a particular community. With only minor local variation, these policy-demanding groups espouse the positions for which their national party stands, and require that candidates do too.72 Hence, even if party primaries are free-for-alls, any candidate who relies on local activists for support is likely to be a credible repre But, while primary free-for-alls are likely to produce good party candidates, some primaries are surprisingly orderly affairs in which interest groups and activists do handpick the winners. In a study of four communities in California, Masket found that each had an active political organization that was deeply involved in primary elec tions for local, state, and congressional offices. None of the local parties looked like a traditional party machine.
Rather, they consisted of networks of office holders, inter est group leaders, activists, consultants, and assorted others.75 In two urban communities, Masket found that success ful party nominees worked up the ladder of an informal Democratic organization dominated by orthodox liber als. In consequence the nominees were liberals too, espe cially on race issues, a matter of intense local concern. In one congressional district, however, an 18-year incum bent drifted toward moderation, voting in favor of fast track trade negotiating authority, and was beaten in his primary by a challenger with strong activist and union backing.
In a third community, the preferences of a conservative
Republican organization, the Lincoln Club, dominated nominations. The club collected dues to use as campaign donations, formed committees to decide which candi dates to support, and wound up on the winning side of almost all Republican nominations in its area. These can didates were invariably conservative. Local party control of nominations is thus alive and well in at least some communities. How many exactly is impossible to say without more investigation. But one point is worth underscoring: If Masket had limited his research to formal party organizations, he would have found much less evidence of party influence.
What is the role of local parties in the larger universe? Do they simply feed ambitious office holders into the legislature, where the real work of party organization then occurs? Or are local nominating coalitions the primary driver of party organization in legislatures?
Further evidence from California addresses this ques tion. In the 1910s, California Progressives enacted an unusually effective set of anti-party reforms. Foremost, among them was cross-filing, which allowed state legisla tive candidates to run in both primaries:
For example, a Republican Assembly member could run in the Democratic primary, as well as her own, without her party affil iation being visible to voters. If she won both primaries (as the vast majority of incumbents did during this era), hers would be the only name appearing on the general election ballot, accom panied, by a "Rep-Dem" hybrid label. Most incumbents won reelection at the primary stage through such means.76
Cross-filing, combined with the absence of party endorsements in primaries, severed the link between local party organization and party nominations. In these cir cumstances, partisan organization ceased to play any real role in the state legislature. Voting for the Speaker became non-partisan and stable voting coalitions largely disap peared. When a Democratic speaker in the 1930s tried to enforce party discipline in service of a New Deal-style agenda, the legislature revolted and he was replaced.
Policy-oriented groups-especially unions, but also the fledgling California Republican Assembly-agitated to end cross-filing. Legislators resisted, but liberal activists were able to end it via a ballot initiative. Almost immediately, interest groups, working through a newly partisan Speaker, became active in party primaries. The subsequently elected
Democratic majority voted as a stable coalition, passing a raft of important liberal legislation. Masket shows that the abolition of cross-filing-that is, the removal of the bar rier to control of nominations by local activists-was the turning point.
Masket's findings are hard to reconcile with the view that legislators create strong parties. In mid-century Cal ifornia, legislators not only didn't try to create strong parties, they resisted measures intended to bring them about. Most political scientists concluded that the reforms, which also affected the GOP because many states created primaries for both parties in response to the reform man date, killed the national parties. If the national party is understood as state party delegates assembling to choose a nominee, this verdict is correct. But in a precursor to our paper's theory of party, Marty Cohen, David Karol, Hans Noel, and John Zaller argued that the national party is better understood as a coalition of policy demanders try ing to elect loyalists to office.77 Working with this broader view, we found that many of the same policy demanders who had been active in the pre-reform system adapted to, and remained important in, the new system. The adapta tion was to reach a consensus ahead of the state primaries and caucuses on a candidate acceptable to all of them, and then to work together to promote that candidate through the new system of delegate selection.
Nominations for President
The key evidence for this thesis consists of public endorsements of candidates made by party leaders and activists prior to the Iowa caucuses, as shown in updated form in figure 5 . In nine of 12 nominations from 1980 to ■2008, the candidate with the most endorsements won nomination; in only one of the 12 cases did a candidate lacking early commitments from insiders win. Changes in endorsement rates preceded rather than followed gains in fund-raising and poll standing. On this evidence, we con cluded that party groups and activists continue to play a big role in the nomination process and often to dominate it. Rank-and-file voters possess the formal power to nom inate, but they normally follow the insider consensus.
The evidence for this view is not definitive. Most strik ingly, the role of insiders seems (in figure 5) actually place their name on a ballot. In the testing phase, office-seekers meet with groups, leaders, activists, fund raisers, and top office holders, who grill them on their strategy to become president and the agenda they would pursue in office. From the candidates' side, the question is whether they can get the backing needed to mount a seri ous campaign. For a few, the answer is a clear yes; they easily and quickly put together juggernauts that suck resources from other candidates and sweep to victory in the state contests. A1 Gore and George W. Bush were in this category in 2000. For some others, the answer is equiv ocal, encouraging the politician to run but guaranteeing nothing. Obama and Clinton were in this category in 2008. And sometimes the answer is so discouraging that the candidate, even a major figure like Gore in 2004, simply drops out. This screening process, though lacking formal structure and difficult for political scientists to observe, explains how a party, conceived as a coalition of interest groups and activists, can often get the candidates it wants out of the nomination process despite the demise of the traditional nominating convention.
We do not claim that the pattern of insider influence in Figure 4 decisively supports our group-centered account.
The recent weaknesses are too important to overlook. The pre-Iowa endorsement data do, however, lend plausibility to our account, and they raise an important question for Hampshire in the late 1800s:
Railroad interests along with timber barons and a few others had control over the party organizations, and local party barons held their fiefs at the grace of the leadership. Both top and bottom elements of the party performed mutual services in the best feu dal tradition-votes from the bottom up and payoffs and patron age from the top down-but there was no doubt that the dominant power rested with leadership. Venality was common as rising economic interests maneuvered to protect and expand their investments. Frequently governors were mere pawns in the hands of party leaders and railroad magnates.82
The greater part of the United States has never been under domination of a political machine. We know much less about how these areas were governed in the nine teenth and early twentieth century. Because historians as well as political scientists do not have well-developed alter natives, the more numerous non-machine cases attract less scholarly attention. It is clear, however, that citizen activ ists were important forces in the Whig and Jacksonian We have challenged this syllogism at two points: First, voters do not pay so much attention to politics that politi cians must faithfully execute their wishes to win election; within fairly broad limits, obfuscation and phony credit claiming work quite well. Second, interest groups and activ ists are the dominant players in political parties, insisting on the nomination of candidates who will exploit the lim itations of voter monitoring to advance party programs.
The evidence for these challenges is obviously not defin itive, but we believe it is strong enough to raise serious doubts about the reigning conception of parties and to establish the plausibility of our own. Our empirical claims are as follows:
• Policy demanders outside of government form new party coalitions and force change in established ones. In this way, policy demanders rather than office hold ers determine the broad agendas of political conflict.
• Centrist members of Congress are more likely to win re-election than extremists, but the former are rare and the latter common in the House. The unneces sary risk borne by most office holders is consistent with our basic notion that policy-demanding groups rather than politicians are the dominant players in parties.
• In this situation, students of parties and elections ought to put tremendous energy into understanding the con struction of party programs. They do not. The study of American of parties and elections is centrally concerned with the rules, techniques, resources, and individual psy chology of electioneering. If our view of political parties were accepted, this field would be recast as the study of organized policy demands, with electioneering an impor tant but secondary concern. The study of party nomina tions, now beneath the radar of most political scientists, would become a focal concern.
Congress. In studying the strategic construction of legis lative institutions, scholars would give serious consider ation to individual motivations beyond the desire to please the median voter in one's district. The agendas of policy demanders external to the institution would be examined in the context of legislative party leaders' decisions and actions. Rob Van Houweling's study of how procedures provide cover for legislators whose preferences are too extreme for their districts is an important step in this direction. 96 Complex legislative and bureaucratic procedures would be systematically studied as factors affecting the informa tion levels of voters, the ambitiousness of policy demands, and the extremism of candidates. The obfuscation implied by efforts to limit traceability (documented effectively by R. Douglas Arnold, Kent Weaver and, more recently, Suzanne Mettler) would be studied in the context of party decisions. 97 Political ideology. The dominant strain of public-opinion research views ideology as a pattern of beliefs and prefer ences that recurs in the minds of many individuals, often as the product of value-based reasoning. It has little con nection either to interest-group agendas or political insti tutions. In our account, ideology reflects a coalitional bargain among diverse policy demanders, to which some voters may also subscribe. It helps parties to create bonds among groups with diverse interests, to screen candidates for nomination, and to monitor incumbents. Ideology is often part of the process that creates and changes party coalitions, and is itself shaped by some of the same stra tegic considerations. As with parties, our theory implies that ideology and public discourse in general will be dom inated by voices that many voters consider too extreme. This conjecture resonates with the findings of Morris Fio rina and others that ideological polarization of elites is not widely shared by ordinary voters.98 Thinking about ide ology in this way draws our attention to the strategic con struction of ideology as an important area of research.
Law and Politics. Parties' structure and nomination pro cesses are highly regulated in the US. Most of the debate about the proper extent of such regulation take place in law reviews, focusing on the First Amendment issues such as whether parties are state actors or private entities enjoy ing attendant freedoms.99 Many practical and important questions are considered, e.g., may party organizations opt for closed primaries? Flow should states determine ballot access? Should public finance laws aim to strengthen parties or undermine them? A better-grounded under standing of the essential character of parties should inform these debates. While some legal scholarship has incorpo rated the mainstream "parties in service" view,100 more recently scholars such as Michael Kang have begun to build our group-centered model into reform proposals. 101 Normative political theory. Theorists of democracy have written prodigiously about political representation as a relationship between office holders and constituents, but have paid much less attention to political parties. This stance could be reasonable if a party were merely an electioneering device. But if a party is a coalition of inter est groups and activists that limits voter choice to candi dates whom it finds acceptable, parties should be given central roles in theories of democracy. Political theorists such as Lisa Disch, Jane Mansbridge, and especially Nancy Rosenblum, have gone some distance toward incorporat ing ideas from the dominant view of parties into norma tive analysis.102 Our alternative view would clearly offer different normative implications which we hope theorists will explore in depth.
Parties and Democracy
In Winner-Take-All Politics, Jacob Hacker and Paul Pier son note that the "dominant view of American politics" in public discourse presents electoral politics as simply a "spec tacle." Characterizing the dominant view (from which they, like us, dissent), they write
In the audience sits a fairly inchoate mass of voters. In the ring are politicians, individual showmen who seek their favor. They succeed or fail in wooing a fickle electorate, partly based on events--Vietnam, riots, an assassination, an economic downturn-and partly on their skill in managing the related challenges. This view of politics is . . . reassuring: If politicians are doing something, it must be because voters want them to. There's just one problem: It misses the essence of American politics. In particular, this near-universal perspective leaves out two critical things: public policy and organized interest groups .103 Contrary to this popular image, Hacker and Pierson develop the view of "politics as organized combat." Con testants in the battle are skilled and resourceful interest groups, especially business, which run roughshod over the unorganized.
We agree with Hacker and Pierson on their central point.
To posit that American politics is mainly organized by election-minded politicians, as the textbook view of Amer ican politics does, is to miss its essence. Organized combat among groups that aim to control policy-making is closer to the heart of the matter.
We would assert as well that many organized groupsrights advocates, environmentalists, labor, pro-life and pro choice groups, to name a few of the more prominent- From a distance of half a century, it is not clear that Schattschneider and Key were right. The contemporary party system cleaves on issues of economics, and it is highly competitive, but the "have-nots" do not seem to be com ing out on top. A likely reason is that, as Hacker and
Pierson say, conflict in the US is conflict between orga nized groups, prominently including conflict within the party system. Since most "have-nots" remain unorga nized, they remain underserved by the parties.
These observations, though speculative, amount to another reason for taking a reserved attitude toward the value of parties to democracy. We do not assert, however, that democratic accountability is worse with parties than without. Perhaps in a society in which politics is compli cated and most citizens are too busy with their lives to pay much attention, group-centric parties are the best that can be realistically hoped for. Perhaps then giving society's most intense policy demanders a semi-institutionalized posi tion at the heart of government is a better way of insuring that all points of view are heard than relying on the insipid discourse of mass politics for this purpose. Not everyone is represented, but many are. Perhaps the solution to the problem of parties and democracy would be more group involvement rather than less, so that all segments of soci ety have representation in the system. We are not sure. We are, however, sure that the answers to these questions will not come from continuing to underplay the role of inter est groups and activists in the party system. 
